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It will be no news to the readers of this symposium that the cost of traffic
accidents in the United States, even on a crass material level, is staggering. Yet it
may help to put the matter in perspective to note that this cost, estimates of which
range from a minimum of $8 billion to over $i2 billion a year, is of roughly the
same magnitude as the entire annual cost of providing the roadways on which these
accidents occur.1 While much effort has been devoted to ascertaining how the
cost of the highway should be apportioned among various classes of traffic, little
attention has been given by economists to the question of how the cost of accidents
should be borne, even in the face of the open scandal that less than half of the
amounts paid as premiums and uninsured judgments ever reaches the injured,
the remainder being frittered away in commissions, administrative expense, and legal
fees.
I
LAw VExsus EcoNoMics
A. Fault Versus Externality
To the jurist, the question poses itself as one of under what circumstances, and
to what extent, losses suffered in the first instance by one party should be shifted
to another and possibly eventually passed on to a class of loss-bearers. In this process
it is axiomatic that, aside from criminal penalities, amounts payable by those to
whom liability attaches, less whatever costs of transfer or adjudication are involved in
the process, should equal the amounts receivable as compensation. In traditional tort
law, the main occasion for such shifting is the fault or culpable negligence of one
of the parties, looked at ex post, with the aid of such doctrines as that of "con-
tributory negligence" and "last clear chance."'2
Even if the jurist goes so far as to admit that liability should attach to some
degree and in some cases even when no error or misconduct can be imputed
to the responsible party, the liability is to be measured by the compensation payable,
and if payment of compensation is not feasible, no civil liability will attach. Thus
*B.A. '935, Yale University; M.A. 1937, Ph.D. i947, Columbia University. Professor of Economics,
Columbia University. Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 1967-68.
'See, e.g., NATIONAL SAFETY CouNcn., AccrDENT FACTS (I968 ed.); THE EcoNoMisr, July 13, 1968,
p. xxi.
'See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF TORTS 426-43 (3d ed. 1964); 2 F. HAIRR &
F. JAmEs, THE LAw OF TORTS 1I93-X263 (I956); C. Moiuus, MoRRIus oN TORTS 211-26 (1953).
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if an unattached person is killed, there may be little or no liability, whether the
individual is a Bowery bum or an Einstein. Or if a car breaks down in a narrow
spot in the road during a period of heavy traffic, the aggregate delay to other
motorists may be evaluated in many hundreds of dollars, but again, since payment
of a dollar or so to each is impractical, no liability ensues. In this case the
maxim de mininis non curat lex applies to each individual share, not to the
amount of the damage to the community as a whole.
Moreover jurisprudence tends in principle, though less in practice, to draw a
sharp line between licit and culpable behavior. Action that fails to transgress this
line may be held to involve damnum absque injuria and carry no penalty, however
great be the damage done to others and however small the potential benefit to the
actor. The economist tends rather to take natura non facit saltum as his motto,
and to insist that the degree of culpability and accountability is measured by the
damage done and not by any arbitrary line defining the limits of acceptable behavior.
B. The Separability of Cost Assessment and Compensation
Further, for the economist there are two distinct questions: (I) the decision
as to what charges should be assessed against an actor for conduct involving actual
injury to others or an increase in risk of injury to others, and (2) a separable
decision as to what compensation should be paid to those injured and under what
circumstances. It may be convenient but it is not logically necessary that the aggre-
gate of charges assessed should just cover the payments to the injured, including
the overhead costs involved. If there is a discrepancy, to be sure, there is a supple-
mentary question of what should be done with the excess funds in the one case or
from what source the deficit should be made up in the other. Even though as a
matter of convenience it may turn out to be desirable to adjust matters so that there
is neither surplus nor deficit, in principle it is a help to clear thinking if the two
matters are kept separate. It turns out in fact, as we next demonstrate, that the
theoretically appropriate level of charges to actors would far exceed, in the aggregate,
the total cost of making compensation payments to individual victims at an
appropriate level (including the very substantial overhead of commissions, fees, under-
writing profits and court costs of the entire process), though in some instances the
excess can be thought of in terms of a rental for the roadway facilities used.
I. Specific and General Levels of Assessment of Costs and Choices
To an economist, a major factor in determining assessments on hazard-creating
actors is the desire to influence their actions in the direction of a more efficient
allocation of resources. This assessment can take place on two levels: assessment as
a consequence of particular accidents or assessment on the basis of the hazardous
activity independent of the involvement of the individual in actual accidents. The
basic consideration here is that an actor has a choice among alternative actions
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and modes of action, that his choice can be an efficient one only if it is made in
terms of a proper weighing of all the consequences likely to follow from the various
alternatives, and that normally it is only if these consequences are fully brought
home to him as a cost, directly or indirectly, that he will be motivated to make the
decision that will properly balance advantages and disadvantages to himself and others.
A corresponding distinction can be made, at this point, between choices concerning
what gross activity one is going to engage in-for example, riding a bus, driving
a car via route A, or driving via route B-and the choices concerning the manner
in which one carries out the activity-for example, whether one is going to drive
carefully or absent-mindedly or even recklessly. In the former case, the choice is an
observable one and charges can to a considerable extent be adjusted according to the
choice made, while in the latter case the choices are to a large extent unobservable and
their consequences for risk of accident are not easy to gauge. In the former type
of case it is possible at least in principle to bring appropriate influence to bear
by ex ante charges relating to the gross activity, whereas in the latter case the
only way in which the appropriate degree of influence can be brought to bear
on the behavior of the individual is through an ex post assessment related to
damage actually inflicted on others.
Indeed, if it were not for the catastrophic nature of accident losses in relation
to the resources of the individuals involved, economic efficiency would be best
served by exacting from every individual who takes action as a result of which
damage is inflicted on others that would have not have occurred in the absence
of this action a payment equal to the full amount of the damage so inflicted.
Moreover, what will sound strange to the juristic mind, the assessment should be
independent of any criterion of fault or relative contributory negligence and further-
more should not be abated or offset in any way by compensation for injuries suffered
by the actor himself!
This result is a direct consequence of the fact that in most of the accidents with
which we are concerned there are two or more parties involved, and the damage
involved in the accident could have been totally avoided if any party had acted
differently, whether by driving less recklessly in the case of the "guilty" party, or
by driving more defensively in the case of the "innocent" party, or by accomplishing
the purpose in some way not involving the specific activity at all, as by travelling by
train rather than automobile, or by living closer to one's place of work, or even
by giving up the object of the trip entirely. The full damages caused by the
accident are part of the "marginal social costs" of each of the activities contributing
to the accident. Double (or triple or more) counting at this point is correct; none
of the activities involved in the accident were economically justifiable unless they
were able to bear the full costs of accidents which would be avoided if the activity
were not undertaken, including whatever overhead costs are necessary, under pre-
vailing institutional arrangements, to provide appropriate payments to victims.
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Economically speaking, it is just as important to provide an adequate incentive for
driving defensively rather than merely nonnegligently as it is to provide an incentive
for driving nonnegligently rather than recklessly. Systems which require payments
by the actors only in case of fault and only to the extent of the compensation received
by others (even with expenses of adjudication and administration added) fail to give
an adequate incentive for seeking out alternatives not involving the increased
risk of vehicular accident.
2. Marginal Versus Average Accident Costs
This notion that proper imputation of marginal costs for purposes of economic
efficiency requires, in the case of the pure two-car accident, that each party be
charged the full cost of the accident, and that the accident be "paid for" twice over,
may at first seem bizarre, but is nonetheless correct, at least on the assumption that
the absence of either vehicle from the scene would not only have averted the acci-
dent that happened but would not have given rise to some alternative accident.
This assumption is, of course, not entirely accurate. In some cases one of the cars
involved constitutes, either from a mechanical defect or the habits of the driver, an
"accident looking for a place to happen," and had the second car not been present at
the critical place and time some other accident would have happened at a subsequent
time. To some extent, also, the presence of high volumes of traffic induces a greater
degree of caution or discipline on the part of the drivers, so that in spite of the
fact that any given car has a larger number of encounters in going from one place
to another under heavier traffic conditions, accidents do not increase in proportion
to the number of such encounters. And of course if traffic is so heavy that speed
is reduced to a crawl, fatal accidents become almost impossible. There are also the
"single-car accidents," in which the presence of other cars is not a factor, though
many accidents reported as single-car accidents actually occur as a result of
evasive action caused by the presence of the car that got away scot-free.
Nevertheless, on balance the statistical data do seem to show that accident rates
increase significantly with increasing traffic flows over the more significant ranges.
Accident data for California freeways for the year 196o through I962' show that on
thirty-two four-lane freeway segments with average daily traffic of between 21,500
and 31,6oo, the accident rate averaged 1.18 per million vehicle miles, while on twenty
segments with average daily traffic between 31,6oo and 46,5oo, the accident rate
averaged 145. In the former class an average of 6,35o vehicles per lane per day
produced 7.493 accidents per iooo lane miles per day; in the second an average of
9,600 vehicles per lane per day produced 13.92o accidents per iooo lane miles per
day. According to these figures an increase in traffic flow of 3250 vehicles per lane
per day would generate an increase in the accident rate of 6,427 accidents per iooo
' R. LUNDY, THE EFFEcT OF TRAFFic VOLUMES AND NUMBER OF LANES ON FREEWAY AccIDENT RATES
(Cal. Div. of Highways, Traffic Bull. No. ix, July 1964).
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lane miles per day, or an incremental accident rate of 1.98 accidents per million
vehicle miles, as contrasted with the average rates of i.i8 and 1.45 respectively for the
two classes of road segments. For four-lane freeways as a whole, the marginal acci-
dent rate is 1.46 times the average accident rate; for six-lane freeways the ratio is i.51,
and for eight-lane freeways i.6o.4
Unfortunately no comparable figures are at hand for urban streets or even high-
ways in general, due largely to the difficulty of classifying miscellaneous highways
according to physical characteristics. There is, however, the indication furnished by
insurance rates, which are up to four times higher for comparable coverage in
congested areas than in uncongested areas.
If, then, there is such an excess of marginal accident costs over average accident
cost-which would imply that users of public highways should pay for their use
something more, on this account, than is necessary to make good the actual losses-
what happens to the excess? In the short run, this excess can be considered part
of the scarcity rent payable for the use of the facilities. In effect, this excess repre-
sents the extent to which the spreading of the traffic over more routes or more lanes
would have diminished the cost of accidents, and in a world of constant returns
to scale, the adding of this rent to other rents due to congestion delays and the like
would produce a sum just sufficient to finance the optimum extent of highway con-
struction. In practice it is likely that significant economies of scale exist in the
construction of rural highways at least and that therefore the optimum level of rural
highway development is somewhat greater than that which could be fully financed
on this basis. On the other hand, urban highway and street facilities are more
likely to be expansible only under conditions of increasing costs, and in this case
optimum development would stop well short of using up all of the rents in financing
the facilities.
3. Accident Rates and Rents
There is, thus, a rather serious logical problem of keeping disentangled the
amounts paid by reason of accident causation and amounts paid as rentals for use of
the facility on which the accidents occur. One could, indeed, think of payment for
use of the facility in two parts: a payment with respect to average accident incidence,
and a payment for the privilege of travelling on less congested or more ample road-
ways where the incidence of accidents is less than it would be on a more congested
' Too much importance should not be given to these precise figures, as they relate to the number of
accidents and not their cost. While one would normally expect that the heavier traffic routes would
generate accidents of greater severity-in particular more cars involved per accident, on the average--
there is on the other hand some indication that the number of fatal accidents does not follow this
pattern. There is also some indication that for very low-traffic segments the relationship is reversed;
this tendency may reflect largely the fact that many of these segments are newly opened ones with a
rapid build-up of traffic over the year, with many more drivers being unfamiliar with the alignment,
temporary end-of-freeway conditions, etc., or possibly without the beneficial effect of a certain minimum
amount of traffic in making it less likely for cars to get into the wrong roadway, or in indicating curves
at night. Such segments accounted for only 3% of the total traffic, however.
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or narrower road. One cannot, then, consider the problem of how much the motorist
should pay with respect to the impact of his use on the accident rate without at the
same time considering how much he pays for the use of the road in relation to other
cost factors, i.e., in relation to (i) the cost of enlarging the roadway network in the
long run, or (2) the congestion costs (delay, additional fuel costs, etc.) in the short
run. And while congestion and accident rates are correlated to a considerable extent,
nevertheless the variation in congestion costs between lightly travelled roads and
heavily travelled roads is far greater than the variation in accident costs, so that
for the lightly travelled rural road it is the accident cost that is the dominant factor,
while in the urban and suburban areas, especially at peak traffic periods, it is
the congestion cost rather than the accident cost that is the dominant factor.
II
EXTERNALITIES AND INSURANCE
A. Subsidization of Motor Vehicle Use Through Externalizing Accident Costs
But even if one would be willing to assume that the excess of marginal accident
cost over average accident cost is taken care of by motor vehicle taxes viewed as
rentals of roadway space, under present conditions not even the average cost is
borne by the motor vehicle economy. The Michigan study of accident compensation
for accidents occurring in the year I958" showed that of total losses amounting to
$178.2 million, suffered by ioi,5oo individuals involved in 59,oo bodily injury acci-
dents, with 86,ioo injured and 1719 deaths, compensation had been obtained in the
amount of only $85.2 million from all sources during the period of about three years
between the time of the accident and that of the study interviews; in addition, there
were expectations of eventually obtaining another $84 million for a total of $93.6
million, leaving $84.6 million to be borne by the accident victim himself. In those
cases where the uncompensated or incompletely compensated accident victims were
pedestrians or roadside property owners, the loss was shifted outside the automobile
economy, and therefore represented a form of subsidy to the automobile.
Of the $85.2 million received in compensation, $46.7 was received in the form of
tort settlements and $17.5 million from the victim's own automobile insurance,
leaving $21 million as amounts received from sources not related to the operation
of automobiles, such as medical and hospital insurance, life insurance, sick leave
payments by employers, social security, and the like. Thus a substantial part, at
least twelve per cent and possibly as much as twenty to twenty-five per cent, of the
costs of accidents resulting from the operation of automobiles is borne in a manner
not impinging in any direct way on the operation of automobiles.
Even to the extent that this cost is borne by automobile users, it is borne through
an extremely costly mechanism and in a manner not particularly conducive to
'A. CONARD et al., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS 137-58 (1964).
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evenly balanced decisions between the use of automobiles and other alternatives.
There are of course the well-documented complaints regarding the inequities and
wastes involved in the current tort-liability-insurance system, epitomized in the
conclusion that of the value of the premiums paid for such insurance by policy-
holders, less than forty-five per cent reaches the injured persons,' and that in a highly
capricious manner, with generous and even duplicative payments to some, and
catastrophically inadequate payments to others. The remaining fifty-five per cent
goes to commissions, expenses, profits, court costs and lawyers' fees.7 But even if
the system were to work without overhead costs, there is in addition the frequently
overlooked fact that the manner in which premiums are computed and paid fails
miserably to bring home to the automobile user the costs he imposes in a manner
that will appropriately influence his decisions.
B. Inappropriate Patterns of Premium Payment
Premiums are paid generally on a periodic basis, varying chiefly in terms of the
characteristics of the usual drivers, the location where the car is normally kept, and
the character of the use. The difficulty is that while these parameters may come
as close as any available to the insurers to permitting rates to be set for different
classes of risks, they provide incentives that are largely inappropriate at the margins
where decisions are actually made as to whether to maintain a car and whether to
make a given trip by car.
The basic difficulty is that the insurance premium appears to the individual auto-
mobile owner almost entirely as part of the fixed cost of owning a car. The amount
of the premium, given the coverage he selects, is fixed by factors largely independent
of most of the decisions that are at all marginal as to how much he will use his car.
The only attempts that are made to vary premiums in relation to use are typically
to classify the risk according to whether and how far the car is driven to work
or whether it is used in business; the classifications are very broad and to a con-
'Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 MICH. L. Rav. 279, 293 (1964);
Conard, Remarks, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 440, 451. See Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money and the
Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Ltigation, 61 COLUM. L. Rav. 1, 20-30 (1961), for
a similar conclusion.
"Even though the existing insurance system results in roughly doubling the cost of the portion of the
total that is covered by insurance, this cannot be taken as an offset to the failure to allow for the excess
of the marginal over the average cost as discussed previously. Given the prevailing institutions, overhead
costs are as much a part of the marginal cost of the hazard-creating activities as the direct losses to the
victims themselves. These costs, too, according to this analysis, should be charged on a marginal basis,
i.e., duplicatively against each party to a two-car accident.
If these overhead costs could be eliminated, the present level of charges would then represent approxi.
mately the appropriate level of generalized deterrence to enlarging the amount of hazard-creating activity,
since the real costs of accidents would then have been reduced. But as long as the costly methods of
dealing with the problem persist, the present level of the hazard-creating activity is excessive and the level
of generalized deterrence inadequate. And as will be seen below, even if the generalized level of deterrence
were correct, the detailed manner in which it impinges on the levels of activity are inappropriate to
producing an optimum level of activity, wholly aside from the influence that such charges might have
on the degree of care exercised in carrying out the activity.
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siderable extent are based on the unverified statements of the applicant. Moreover,
the variations in premiums based on such classifications remain relatively small.
The result is that with the possible exceptions of the decision as to whether to drive
to work or use public transportation, and of the decision as to whether younger
members of the family are to be allowed to drive at all, the added exposure to risk
involved in added usage is not brought to bear on the decision.
Even to the extent that the premium might in principle be affected by the usage
decided upon, the differences in premiums are minor relative to the possible differ-
ences in exposure. The fact that the differentials are based largely on the un-
verified representations of the policyholder makes it difficult to apply more sub-
stantial differentials, especially in the face of competition: to have differentials that
would present too strong a temptation to misrepresentation would overload the
company offering such differentials with risks that are not only misrepresented but
involve policyholders with less integrity and responsibility, who may be correspond-
ingly poor risks on that account. Especially when it comes to renewals, policyholders
who would not directiy misrepresent their position may be more negligent in inform-
ing the insurer of adverse than of favorable changes in their status.
When it comes to decisions as to whether to maintain a car, or perhaps a second
or third car, the cost of insurance appears in most cases as an excessive deterrent.
The individual who is on the margin of decision is more likely to be one who if he
decides to maintain the car will be using it substantially less than the average or,
especially in the case of the second car, will be on the margin precisely because
the occasions when the two cars would be in use simultaneously will be less fre-
quent, so that the availability of the second car would add relatively little to the
total mileage. To be sure, moderate discounts are often allowed by insurers for the
insurance of a second car under the same ownership, but the discounts that could
be offered on this basis, even if they could be made sufficient to reflect fully the
difference in exposure for the classification as a whole without stimulating fictitious
nominal arrangements, would still not eliminate the overcharge of the marginal
car.
Moreover, the problem of reliance on the representations of the insured is much
more serious than with fire, life, and other types of insurance where it is possible
to rely at least on the possibility that investigation at the time of casualty will
reveal any gross misrepresentation; this possibility is much less significant in the case
of automobile liability insurance. Moreover, to permit the insurer to avoid liability
on the ground of such misrepresentation would to that extent make compulsory
insurance and financial responsibility laws ineffective in protecting the innocent
victims.
C. Correcting the Premium Structure
The premium structure thus has the general effect of promoting excessive use of
a given stock of cars and undue stinting on the ownership of cars (a fact, incidentally,
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which should engage the attention of the automobile industry). To be sure, a
premium structure that varied in strict proportion to mileage might be held to go
somewhat too far in the other direction, in that cars driven more intensively may be
driven more skillfully (though not necessarily as carefully), so that the risk of accident
would not be proportional to the mileage. But it seems unlikely that premiums
proportional to mileage would be as far from the mark as the present pattern.
There is no real conceptual difficulty in charging an insurance premium according
to mileage; the problem is one of implementation. If it were not for the widespread
practice of turning back odometers, it would not be too difficult for insurance com-
panies to charge premiums subject to a rebate figured on the odometer reading at
the end of the year, creditable on the next year's premium. Although stock companies
in particular have been reluctant to engage in retrospective rating of single-car risks,
both in terms of the transaction costs and the resistance of policyholders to making
larger initial premium payments, the experience of dividend-paying mutual companies
would seem to indicate that these difficulties are not insurmountable. Proposals that
are afoot to make it illegal to reset odometers, primarily on grounds of honesty in
trade with respect to used cars, coupled with the development of more tamper-
proof odometers by automotive manufacturers might in time make such a procedure
practical.
A close alternative would be to tie the insurance premium to the sale of tires or
gasoline. Indeed the notion of motor vehicles using "insured tires," whereby the
manufacturer of the tires or an associated insurance company identified in some way
on the tire itself, would be responsible for indemnifying the victims of any accidents
in which the vehicle using the tires may be involved has a certain attraction. Coverage
could be suitably varied in accordance with a supplementary contract in which the
serial number of the tires would be referred to; for most users, however, a standard
minimum coverage could be presumed in the absence of any such supplementary
contracts. Another attractive feature of such a scheme would be that the high tire
wear associated with high speeds would imply higher effective premiums per mile.
The association of accident liability with tire manufacture would also provide addi-
tional incentive for the manufacturer to develop tires with safety features that are
actually effective (instead of merely features that can be advertised as promoting
safety).
To avoid an undue tendency to use the tires beyond the point of safety, it would
be necessary to provide some form of credit based on the weight of used tires
turned in, which would in turn present a significant added administrative expense.
Even this, however, should prove much less costly than the present commissions and
other expenses in conjunction with the writing of insurance policies.
The main serious defect in the insured tire concept, however, is that it would
not permit adequate geographical variation in the rates: there would be no way
of preventing tires purchased in a rural low-risk area being used predominantly in
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a congested high-risk area. It would still be possible to sell insured tires at rates
reflecting use predominantly in high risk areas, and leave those who drive primarily
in lower risk areas to seek some other form of protection. But it does not seem that
the advantages of such a scheme would be sufficient to warrant the setting up of
a separate scheme to cover only a fraction of the problem, while as a universal or
even predominant scheme the difficulties seem too great.
The corresponding notion of "insured gasoline" may have more to recommend
it. Indeed, in those jurisdictions such as Saskatchewan' with a compulsory state
scheme of insurance, it would seem that it would be more equitable and less costly
in terms of administration to collect the premiums paid into the fund in the form
of a surcharge on the gasoline tax rather than as periodic premiums of the con-
ventional sort. Such a gasoline tax surcharge would also be extremely appropriate
if, as under the proposals under consideration in New Zealand,' victims of all kinds
of accidents are to be made eligible for compensation on a uniform and compre-
hensive basis out of a state fund. The fact that victims are taken care of as an
integral part of a more comprehensive scheme is no excuse for not charging against
the motor vehicle user the social costs incident to his activity. As with tires, the
fact that the burden of such a gasoline surcharge would vary with speed is an
advantage.
The main advantage of using gasoline rather than tires as a base is that the
premium rate can be varied to a considerable extent to reflect geographical variations
in risk. This does mean that to some extent at least the tax will have to be assessed
on the basis of the retail outlet, but it should not be difficult to collect the tax from
wholesalers on the basis of delivery records. It may also mean that drivers who
drive repeatedly between low rate and high rate areas will be able to avoid the
higher premiums appropriate to their driving in the high rate areas by buying
preferentially in the low rate areas. But since in many cases distribution costs are
higher where the premium rates would be low, a considerable variation in the
premium can exist without running into more serious problems on this score.' A
' The Automobile Accident Insurance Act, 1963, z2 Eliz. 2, ch. 38 (Saskatchewan), as amended, 13
Eliz. 2, ch. 5z (Saskatchewan, 1964). For a discussion of the plan, see R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC
PR OTECTION FoR THE TRAFFic Vsarcm 140-48 (1965).
See Derham & da Costa, Absolute Liability, i N.Z.U.L. REx-. 37 (z963); Barry, Compensation
Without Litigation, 37 AusTsr. L.J. 339 (1964); Tiu EcoNomis-r, July 13, 1968, p. xxi.
" Prices can vary considerably even within the same community without driving the high price outlets
out of business: regular grade gasoline retail prices vary in Palo Alto from 28.90 to 34.90 and run as
high as 42.90 in other parts of California (e.g., Bridgeport). An insurance premium ranging from say
i5o per gallon in San Francisco (which has the highest insurance rates of any area in the state) to say
30 per gallon along the Nevada border should not cause any great amount of "premium-dodging." A
more serious problem would exist if a boundary between a state having such a gasoline surcharge schene
and one that does not runs through a metropolitan' area; a io or 150 differential in the gasoline tax
and surcharge between Maryland and the District of Columbia, for example, would have quite serious
effects on the pattern of fuel distribution. A study team of the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development has actually proposed that gasoline tax rates be higher in and near the urban
centers of the Central American countries and lower in the rural areas, at least to the point where the
total price would be as high in the urban center as in the remoter areas; this is however thought of
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more serious difficulty may be the problem of reconciling such differentials with
uniformity clauses in state constitutions, to say nothing of the political problems
involved in defending whatever rate pattern results from the application of reason-
ably objective economic criteria from the pressures of affected local interests.
If the notion of "insured gasoline" is to be applied in conjunction with the
payment of benefits through private insurers, there is somewhat more of a problem
than with tires of identifying the company to be responsible for compensating the
victims of any particular accident. The most directly comparable procedure would
be to use some type of tracer compound mixed in with the gasoline that would be
identified by chemical analysis after the accident, but this is at best fairly clumsy and
in some cases would not work at all, as when the vehicle is destroyed by fire.
While some arrangement might be made for treating such cases as assigned risks, the
complications this would entail detract considerably from the attractiveness of the
notion as a whole. If some kind of mandatory uniform rate could be established
in conjunction with a compulsory insurance scheme, it would be possible for each
motorist upon signing up with a particular company to have affixed to his license
plate a suitable tab, the gasoline retailer then being required to record the amount
of gasoline sold to automobiles bearing the tabs of different insurers so that the
appropriate amount of the premium collected with the sale of the gasoline can be
credited to the proper insurer. To the extent that gasoline is sold through credit
,cards, an appropriate indication on the credit card would enable this to be done
automatically.
Still another possibility might be for a state fund to be generated by whatever
combination of gasoline tax, tire tax, and license fee surcharges is deemed appropriate,
and. allow insurance companies to take on the task of settling claims relative to
suitably packaged sets of automobiles on the basis of competitive bids paid out of
the general fund. In principle, drivers' licenses could also be surcharged in rela-
tion to the age and other characteristics of the driver, to accomplish somewhat the
same distribution of the burden as is now accomplished by the classification of the
insurance companies; but while the incidence and effects of such a surcharge would
be much the same as the present premium differentials, the differentials might be
much more difficult to maintain as political decisions than when developed as a
result of competition among private firms.
Even in the absence of mandatory legislation, the widespread use of oil-company
credit cards opens up a possibility for billing for insurance coverage along with
gasoline, with the insurance premium varying according to the amount of gasoline
bought. This would require some means of checking on purchases of gasoline other
than via the credit card: affixing a seal to the gasoline tank of the car after each
credit-card purchase, together with a record of the odometer reading on the sales
as a means of reflecting congestion cost rather than accident costs. Churchill, A Study ol Road User
Charges in Central America (Int'l Bank for Reconst. and Dcv. 1968) (mimeo.)
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ticket, would afford a reasonably adequate check, permitting appropriate assessments
to be made in the event of occasional purchases without the credit card. Or the
premium assessed could be based primarily on the odometer readings, the tie-in
with gasoline purchases serving primarily as a check that the odometer is not
tampered with, it being not ordinarily worthwhile to set the odometer back by
sufficiently small amounts to present a reasonable pattern.
A variety of possibilities thus exist for bringing the cost assessed against the
motorist on the general activity level closer to the accident experience associated with
the gross character and extent of the activity than is achieved by existing premium
tariffs. Still further possibilities would be opened up if the schemes for levying
congestion tolls that are being considered in England and elsewhere are imple-
mented.1 These congestion charges are generally discussed primarily in terms
of bringing home to users of congested facilities the costs they inflict on others
through increasing congestion and delays, but there is nothing at all difficult about
extending the concept to cover whatever additional accident risks exist in congested
areas over and above those existing in noncongested areas. Indeed there is .a
fairly close analogy between externalities involved in accidents and those involved
in congestion, the main difference lying in the existence of a fault element in many
but not all of the accident situations. A gasoline-related premium could then be
charged at a level representing the level of hazard in uncongested areas, with rela
tively little variation needed from one area to another, while the excess of the
appropriate rate in the congested area over that prevailing in adjacent noncongested
areas would be assessed through the congestion charge mechanism.
III
MOTIVATING BETTER SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
A. Post-Accident Premium Increases
There remains the problem of what, if anything, should be done to attempt to
motivate improved specific performance levels. Here the proponents of nonfault,
or "workmen's compensation" treatment, go all the way to one extreme and insist
that fault should have nothing to do with the payment of compensation, and that
the function of penalizing the culpable parties, to the extent that the penalty in-
flicted by the accident itself in terms of inconvenience, .uncompensated losses, and
humiliation is insufficient, should take the form of fines or other penalties for
identifiable misdemeanors associated with "fault." At the other extreme the pure
logic of the position taken by some of the advocates of the retention of fault would
seem to require that the negligent driver should be deterred by the prospect of bear-
ing the full consequence of his negligence and that tort liability insurance, far from
being compulsory, should be forbidden. It is only a very partial rescue of this
" See Walters, The Economics of Road User Charges (Int'l flank for Reconst. and Dev. 1968)
(mimeo.); Churchill, supra note 8.
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position to claim that classification of risks under tort insurance will retain at least
some of this sanction. While to some extent the threat of being placed in a higher
rate classification as a result of a claim (not necessarily one involving the fault of
the insured) acts as an incentive to exercise care, the bulk of the individuals who are
placed in a higher rate classification are so placed largely by circumstances beyond
their control. The nineteen-year-old, male, unmarried car owner can drive with the
skill of a Rickenbacker and the caution of Aunt Matilda without this having any
effect on his high rate classification. In a sense, it is precisely the class of driver
that most needs the incentive for which the system provides the least incentive, in
that his rate is already so high it can hardly go much higher.
SMoreover the application of a significant sanction of increased rates for drivers
with-poor driving records is precisely one of the situations that has led to discontent
with the present system. It is conceivable that with more stringent regulation of the
classification process a sanction of this sort could be applied in a way that is
acceptable to the public and reasonably related to the deterrent function sought for
by the defenders of the fault criterion. But this would require a fairly substantial
reformation of present rating practices, which look rather to the competition for
the better risks, often by methods which could properly be characterized as "guilt
by classification," and ignore almost completely the incentive effects of the rating
scheme.
• Even at best, the threat of higher insurance rates is a somewhat more remote
penalty and accordingly is less effective as a sanction than a corresponding lump-
sum payment at the time of an accident, though it may be possible to contemplate
a larger aggregate penalty if it is spread over a number of years and can be avoided
by giving up driving than if it is concentrated in a lump sum. Nevertheless, if what
is wanted is a deterrent effect that does not result in incapacitating the faulty drivers
financially, it does seem that something other than a retrospective rating for future
premiums can be devised.
B. Shared Liability as an Incentive for Care
Indeed, if one goes as far as possible in the direction of the sanction-against-fault
approach compatible with a reasonable degree of protection against catastrophe, what
would seem to be called for would be some form of co-insurance or deductible
amount in liability insurance. It is somewhat anomalous that liability insurance
never provides for a deductible amount, so that the insured motorist is typically
relieved of all burden of compensating other victims of his faulty behavior but often
must bear the burden of a deductible if he is the innocent victim of an accident that
is not demonstrably the fault of another, so that he must look to his own collision
insurance for compensation.
Ideally, the amount of the loss to be borne by the driver at fault should be
fixed in relation to his income or wealth so as to represent a sacrifice commensurate
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with the degree of fault involved. At this point one can well call for the explicit
adoption of a rule of relative or comparative negligence, difficult as this may be to
apply; otherwise there would be no incentive provided to comply with the admoni-
tion to "drive defensively."' 2
IV
FURTHER IMPERFECTIONS IN THE SYSTEM
A. Liability Limits
An even greater anomaly in the liability insurance system is the existence of
liability limits. The basic purpose of insurance is to protect the insured against
catastrophic events which would otherwise spell financial disaster, rather than to
save him harmless from the minor adverse eventualities, particularly when these
are in some measure consequences of his activities. There is no warrant either in
prudence or in equity in permitting insurers to sell partial protection that leaves
the way open for the bankruptcy of the insured and the inadequate satisfaction
of legitimate claims. Even though the insured might rationally prefer a lower limit
on the ground that, in the event of a really large claim, bankruptcy would limit the
amount he would actually have to pay to much less than the full amount of the
judgment, and that the extra premium he would have to pay is too much of a
sacrifice when weighed against the very small chance of this serious but limited
disaster to his personal fortune, it is not in the social interest to allow him this
option in that his choice is in this case being made with inadequate consideration
being given to the social costs involved in the unpaid judgment and his own bank-
ruptcy and default to other creditors.
B. Overhead: Contingent Fees
Still another aspect of the problem is the distribution of the burden of the over-
head costs involved in the transfer of funds from highway users to governments as
taxes and as rents for the use of the facilities provided, and to accident victims as
compensation. Certainly considerations of equity to the victims as well as account-
ability for the full social costs occasioned by accident-prone activity would call for
all of these overhead costs, except possibly those associated with collections of out-
right taxes (as distinct from user charges), to be borne by the highway user rather
than the accident victim. Yet the legal theory generally in effect in the United
" Comparative negligence statutes have been enacted in Mississippi, Nebraska, Wisconsin, South
Dakota, and Arkansas. The Nebraska and South Dakota statutes apply only when Flaintiff's negligence
is "slight" compared with that of defendant. Georgia has adopted comparative negligence by giving
general application to a statute designed only for railroad accidents. W. PROSSER, HA BaooK oN
THE LAw oF ToRTs 443-49 (3d ed. 1964). The Illinois Appellate Court recently adopted comparative
negligence after being directed to consider the issue by the Illinois Supreme Court. Maid v. Frelk, 85
Ill. App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284 (1967). See Comment, Judicial Adoption of a Comparative Negligence
Rule in Illinois, z967 U. ILL. L.F. 351.
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States denies any allowance with respect to the claimant's attorney's fees in the
amount of the award, leaving the claimant to receive, net, substantially less than
the sum that has been adjudged necessary to make him whole. For cases where a
lawyer is retained, the lawyer's fee typically absorbs a quarter to a third of the gross
settlement, leaving the victim substantially undercompensated.'3 To be sure, juries
in determining amounts to be awarded with respect to the intangible factors of
"pain and suffering" may inflate this element somewhat to allow for the lawyer's
share, but at least in those cases where the amount of the claim is fairly well defined
in terms of out-of-pocket costs and actuarial evaluations, there may be little room
for such extralegal justice.
The reluctance of courts to award damages inclusive of claimants' costs is to some
extent related to the prevalence of the contingent-fee basis of handling claims, which,
although dominant in United States accident practice, is considered unethical and
even unlawful in other jurisdictions. Under such circumstances the legal fee, being
defined in terms of the gross settlement, is less directly related to the time, effort,
and out-of-pocket costs involved in representing the specific client. Especially where
the lawyer involved has other dealings or relationships with the claimant, there might
arise some suspicion that the stated legal expenses might be inflated; even when
the matter is at arm's length, the notion that the lawyer's fee would be paid out
of the settlement, or not at all may generate too much of a temptation for the
claimant to insist on prolonging litigation.
C. Obstacles to Fair Settlements
It should be noted that this tendency of the courts to exclude claimants' attorneys'
fees in awarding damages has a significant influence on cases settled out of court
and even cases settled prior to the retention of a lawyer, in that such exclusion
permits insurers to hold out for a settlement in terms of the actual provable loss
less a hypothetical attorney's fee, since that is the maximum the claimant could
obtain by going to court. The relative bargaining power of the parties is such that
an attempt on the part of the claimant to obtain better terms by threatening to retain
a lawyer or take the case to court is unlikely to succeed in obtaining significantly
better treatment unless, indeed, the insurer is induced by public relations considera-
tions or the like to refrain from pressing its advantage.
Still another sinister element in the bargaining over claim settlement is the
impact of the liability limit. Insurance companies often insist on carrying a case
to court in the face of an offer of settlement satisfactory to the insured, motivated
by the likelihood that if the court award turns out to be lower than the offer of
settlement the insurance company will be the gainer, but in the case of a sub-
stantially higher award that exceeds the policy limits the insured will be liable for
the excess. In flagrant cases of this kind courts have recently held the insurer
" See Franklin, Chanin & Mark, supra note 5, at 2o-3o.
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liable for the full award regardless of the policy limit,1' but to achieve this result
not only does there have to be a separate suit by the insured against the insurer, but
the offer or possibility of out-of-court settlement has to be sufficiently patent to be
provable in court. Thus while these recent decisions have helped somewhat in
the more flagrant situations of this kind, the tendency of insurers to take an undue
number of cases to trial against the interests of their policyholders remains a serious
one. The prevalence of this tendency is still another cogent reason for the abolition
of policy limits.
D. Reform of the Settlement Process
It should be possible to develop rules of procedure in settling claims that will
be much more conducive to rapid settlement, out of court, with lower costs of
settlement and greater equity than characterize the present procedures. In developing
such procedures it is important to get rid of the fiction that the case is between two
individuals of equal resources and bargaining power, and recognize explicitly that
the typical case is between an individual of limited means and a large insurance
company. Formal symmetry in such a situation is not only not required, it is out
of place.
A basic step in developing such a procedure would be to provide that once the
basic amount of a lump-sum award has been determined by the court, then
unless a record can be produced of a bona-fide offer of settlement for a figure at least
as great as the amount of this award plus the claimant's reasonable costs incurred
in good faith up to the date of the offer, the entire costs of the claimant will be
added to the basic award. If such a record is produced, the award will be increased
by the amount of the claimant's costs incurred up to the date of the first offer meeting
this condition. Any such offers of settlement would, of course, not be admissible
evidence prior to the determination of the basic award. One could appropriately in-
clude in the costs for this purpose interest at a rate at least equal to that typically
charged for low-grade consumer credit, say ten to fifteen per cent per year. It should
not be too difficult to develop analogous provisions for dealing with cases where the
settlement is not in terms of a lump sum.
While one could provide, symmetrically, that where a record is produced of an
offer that is adjudged adequate according to the above criterion and which was
refused by the claimant, the award to the claimant would be diminished by the
insurer's costs of handling the case subsequent to the qualifying offer, this nominally
even-handed treatment seems not to be called for in view of the resources of the
"'See, e.g., Crisi v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324, 236 A.2d 269 (1967). Dicta in the Crisi case indi-
cate that the California courts may be headed toward strict liability for failure to accept settlement within
the insured's policy limits. See Comment, Crisi's Dicta of Strict Liability for Insurer's Failure to Settle: A
Move Toward Rational Settlement Behavior, 43 WAsH. L. REv. 799 (1968). See generally Annot., 40
A.L.R.ad i68 (1955).
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parties. Indeed, there might be some difficulty in separating out the costs of the
insurer applicable to a particular case; moreover in the event of a claimant's being
held not entitled to any award, the result would nominally require a net payment
by the claimant to the insurer, which could result in an undesirable degree of hard-
ship. Realism is more important here than formal symmetry.
V
SOME REFLECTIONS ON COMPENSABLE DAMAGES
A. Pain and Suffering
Another element in the evaluation of the amount to be paid the victim that is
difficult to determine and the subject of much controversy is that of compensation
for "pain and suffering." Being essentially subjective in nature, it is difficult to
evaluate, particularly in the individual case; moreover, the lengths to which attorneys
and the litigants they represent are often induced to go in attempting to play upon
the sympathies of juries in an effort to obtain a higher award with respect to this
element are often not such as to reflect credit on the judicial process. The difficulties
of determining the proper amount to be awarded on this basis have indeed led many
proponents of reform in auto accident compensation to advocate elimination of this
factor in whole or in part. To eliminate this element in damages, however, would
to that extent depart from the ideal of justice to suffering victims. It does seem
possible, though perhaps not as easy as it might seem at first, to arrive at some form
of more or less arbitrary compromise formula that will eliminate the need for the
unseemly histrionics while at the same time coming closer to justice than limiting
recoveries to bare out-of-pocket costs. One simple rule might be to allow under
this heading an amount equal to some percentage of all associated medical expense.
The main difficulty is that this would furnish the victim with an incentive to pad
such medical bills. A schedule of fixed amounts with respect to varying categories
of injury would be somewhat arbitrary, but certainly better than no allowance
at all and probably better than the capricious results of present practice.
But whatever doubts one might have as to the advisability in practice of paying
ill-defined amounts to the victims with respect to pain and suffering, there can
be no doubt that some global allowance for the pain and suffering caused by
automobile accidents in general should be an element of the charges levied against
those engaging in the activities responsible for this pain and suffering. To argue
otherwise is, in effect, to assert that in deciding between alternative means of attain-
ing an objective no consideration should be given to the relative amounts of pain
and suffering involved in their use. just as it is proper and efficiency-promoting to
charge the individual motorist who contributes to congestion even though it would
be impractical and to a degree self-defeating to attempt to distribute the amounts
collected among the specific motorists who are adversely affected, it is proper to
charge motorists an amount reflecting the over-all aggregate of pain and suffering
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS: AN ECONOMIST'S CRITIQUE
resulting from their activity, even though there may be insuperable obstacles to
distributing the amounts so collected equitably among the specific victims.
B. Allowance for Alternative Sources of Compensation
An even clearer case occurs when consideration is given to what, if any, account
should be taken of other sources of accident compensation available to the victim, such
as Blue Cross, sick-leave provisions in labor contracts, social security, income-tax deduc-
tions and exemptions, and the like. It is indeed inequitable that some individuals, as
happens not infrequently, should obtain in effect duplicate compensation for their
damages so as to emerge actually better off as a result of the accident. 5 Many reform
plans, indeed, including the Keeton-O'Connell proposal, have proposed that awards
made to victims be reduced to allow in full for all of these other sources of compensa-
tion available to the victim, including even the fact that the award itself is not subject
to income tax.-6 From the standpoint of what is required to make the victim whole,
this position is indeed sound in principle, though one would have to be careful
in applying it so as not to unduly discount such elements as the fact that use of
sick leave on account of an automobile accident might diminish the amount of such
allowances available in case of a subsequent illness or disability.
What is true of the amount to be paid to the victim, however, is again not true
of the appropriate amount to be charged to the automobile user. The activity causing
the accident has inflicted losses on the employer who pays the sick-leave benefits, or
on Blue Cross subscribers generally whose rates will have to be increased, in the
long run, if the added cost of caring for such accident victims is to be covered.
Thus while it may be appropriate to reduce compensation awards on one or more
of these grounds, it is definitely not appropriate to reduce the premiums or other
charges assessed against motorists on this ground. Rather, if it proves impossible
to arrange payments from insurance funds to compensate the adversely affected
employers, Blue Cross plans, and the like, it still becomes appropriate to have a
corresponding sum collected from motorists and paid to some appropriate govern-
ment agency, merely as a means of keeping the cost to the motorist of his use of
highways in line with the true social costs and thus inhibiting excessive develop-
ment of this accident-prone activity.
Accordingly the attempt of the developers of the Basic Protection Plan to seize on
these sources of compensation as a means of reducing the premiums required to be
paid by motorists is wrong in economic principle, however much it may contribute
to the political attractiveness of their proposal in the land of the rubber-shod sacred
1 see James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 537 (1952). Insurance is generally not to be considered in computing damages, C. MCCOu.UcK,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 310 n.2, 323, 324 n.i2 (1935), and the fact that a defendant
does or does not have insurance is not usually admissible in evidence. C. McColumcK, HANDBOOK ON THE
L~w oF EVIDENCE 355-58 (1954).
' R. KEETrON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 278-80.
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cow. Actually much of the savings might turn out to be relatively short-lived,
for if Blue Cross, sick leave, and other benefits once become generally deductible
in computing accident compensation awards, it is not likely to be long before
Blue Cross insurance plans, employers, and others making such payments insert
clauses in their contracts denying payment where accident compensation is available,
if indeed such clauses are not already fairly prevalent.
VI
MODIFYING THE SYSTEM
A. Inefficiency of the Transfer Process
Before all of the above economic analysis is taken up at face value, however,
some recognition is required of the extreme costliness and inefficiency of the entire
process by which funds are transferred from the automobile user to the victim. In-
deed, this inefficiency is so extreme that, unless some means can be found to improve
the situation, what might under less costly operating conditions be deemed roughly
adequate arrangements become highly questionable simply because the leakage is
so high. If, for example, of every $ioo paid in by the motorist the victim were
to receive, say, $*, then one might be willing to insist that the system of compensa-
tion should come reasonably close to making the victim whole. If, however, as
seems to be the current situation in the United States, it costs the motorist well
over $2o0 to put $ioo into the pockets of the victim, one may well want to stop
short of doing exact abstract justice to the victim at a cost of this magnitude.
This cost is clearly chargeable primarily to the function of putting the money
in the pockets of the victim and only slightly to that of charging appropriate social
costs to motorists. While in a sense the cost of premium collection can be thought
of as a cost of charging social costs to motorists, it is clear that the premium collec-
tion system is neither designed with this end in view nor particularly well adapted
to its accomplishment. This end can be achieved accurately enough for most purt
poses at negligible overhead costs simply by raising the level of gasoline and other
vehicular taxes.
The cost of operating the automobile accident compensation system can be set
forth as follows: Total automobile insurance premiums earned in 1967 amounted to
$8.9 billion, to which would have to be added some 0.4 billion of interest earned
on these funds between the time of receipt of the premiums and the time of
payment of the claims; losses incurred amounted to $5.4 billion. Not all of this
latter amount reached claimants, however; Conard's Michigan study showed that
claimants in accident cases involving bodily injury spent $ii.8 million to obtain
a total of $64.3 million in tort settlements and payments on their own automobile
insurance policies, or over eighteen per cent.17 If the same ratio applied generally,
this would mean on a national scale about $i.o billion of collection expenses, leaving
21 A. CONAD et al., supra nOte 4, at 138-39.
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a net payment to victims of $4.4 billion out of the total of $9.3. The above figures,
moreover, include payments to policyholders under collision, medical payments, and
other similar insurance; if attention were focused on tort liability payments the
picture would be even worse.
B. Reducing Overhead Costs
This $4.9 billion of unproductive overhead in the accident compensation process
can be split between $2.5 billion for the collection of premiums, and $2.4 billion for
the payment of benefits."' Anything that can reduce these costs is of direct benefit.
On the other hand, while reductions in the aggregate amount of benefits paid do not
in themselves constitute a reduction in costs, and indeed are likely to redistribute the
costs more inequitably and to increase inefficiency, a reduction in the aggregate
amount of benefits would at least be likely to induce a reduction in the waste of
resources in unproductive overhead costs. The relationship is by no means a firm
one, however, and some reductions in benefit payments might well have only a
small or even an adverse effect on these overheads. In particular, the proposal to
require compensation to be computed net of alternative sources of compensation
might require additional investigative expenditures to ascertain their availability
and amount.
The costs of paying benefits, in turn, can be conceptually split between the cost
of ascertaining fault and the cost of ascertaining damage. While much of the
criticism of the existing system has focused on the high cost and low reliability
of the fault ascertainment process, little hard evidence seems to be available as to
the relative costs involved. If one postulates as a rather daring guess that these
costs are split half and half, this would in effect mean that the question of retention
of the fault system is essentially one of balancing a cost of $12 billion plus whatever
contribution the system makes to the demoralization of the judicial process against
the benefits of whatever deterrent to reckless behavior filters through the insurance
system (via the rating of risks on the basis of past individual experience) plus the
avoidance of whatever repugnance there may be to the payment of benefits to victims
of their own negligence. At this point the accident bar may in effect bellow "Fiat
justitia, ruat coelum," but economists are likely to inquire whether more significant
increments of justice are not to be had in other areas at far less cost. Costly justice
is inferior justice, if indeed it is not actually injustice in disguise.
If reduction in the cost of handling compensation for automobile accidents is
a main objective, it seems clear that the collection of premiums as an integral part
of gasoline and other highway user taxes would be the most important single
measure, bringing about a substantial savings per year at current levels. Elimina-
tion of fault as a barrier to recovery and as a determinant of the source of payment
SBErSr's FiRE AND CAsUALTY AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES (1967).
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would be another substantial element in such cost reduction. The most intractable
element in the overhead costs is that of ascertaining the amount of the allowable
claim. Elimination of the intangible elements of "pain and suffering" would be
an important factor here; alternatively, the use of some form of arbitrary formula
might also eliminate much of these costs, though raising problems in other directions
through creating incentives for the padding of costs. It is to be noted, however,
that because of the way in which these various administrative costs interact, once
premium payment costs and fault ascertainment costs have been substantially elim-
inated, the importance of reducing the costs of ascertaining the amount of claims
will be reduced, since these costs are then no longer magnified by these other over-
heads.
Such considerations obviously point fairly strongly in the direction of handling
automobile accident compensation through a public or semipublic agency, with
benefit payments financed out of increments to or variations on the existing system
of motor vehicle user charges and paid largely without regard to fault.
C. Reform of the Private Insurance System
If, on the other hand, some form of private insurance based on fault is to be
retained because of a desire to provide appropriate sanctions for careful driving,
reinforced by a deeply ingrained preference for private rather than public enterprise,
the system needs to be drastically revised in a number of ways.
First, some form of comparative negligence doctrine needs to be explicitly endorsed
in order to preserve an incentive for "defensive" driving beyond the point of mere
avoidance of what is now legally recognized as "fault." This does not mean that
if both drivers involved in a two-car accident are held to be equally at fault neither
of them should have a claim against the other, and each should be left to nurse his
own wounds, as is presently the result under the doctrine of contributory negligence
where only liability insurance is carried; rather, in such a case the two parties should
be held, through their insurers, to share equally in liability for the combined damage;
nor should the liabilities be netted out so as to leave no claim against the insurer of
the car suffering the greater damage.
In theory, if drivers A, B, and C are involved in a collision, incurring damage in
the amounts of X, Y, and Z respectively, and if the relative responsibility for the
accident is fixed at p, q, and r, with p + q + r = i, then A together with his liability
insurer would be called on to pay pY to B and pZ to C, B together with his liability
insurer would pay qX to A and qZ to C, and C together with his liability insurer
would pay rX to A and rY to B. The balance of the loss would be covered, if at
all, by collision, medical payments, or other nonliability insurance, the amounts
collected by each from his own insurer, in the event such insurance coverage is in
force, being pX, qY, and rZ, respectively.
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Second, if any rationale at all is to be retained for the fault procedure, parties at
fault must be required to provide some substantial but not crippling contribution
to the payment of claims, and the covering of this contribution by insurance policies
must be forbidden. The deductible amount might be specified by some such formula
as all of the first $ioo of the liability resulting from any one accident, plus one-third
of the liability, up to a maximum in any one twelve-month period of a sum to be
specified in the policy and required to lie between, say, ten and thirty per cent
of the insured's average federal income tax liability over the preceding three years.
Specification of too low a deductible would incur the penalty that in the event of
an accident the minimum limit would nevertheless be used as the deductible
amount. Specification of a deductible in excess of the lawful maximum would
carry the penalty that if the insurance company permits such a minimum to be
written into the policy, and the insured proves unable to meet a judgment, the in-
surer will nevertheless be liable for all judgments above the maximum permissible
deductible. To avert hardship to victims where the responsible party is unable to
pay the deductible portion of the award specified in conformity to stipulations such
as the above, an unsatisfied judgment fund would have to be set up to provide for
such payments to be made promptly on behalf of those adjudged partly or wholly
at fault, with the right of such parties to own or operate automobiles being either
denied completely or being conditioned on suitable surcharges or installments being
paid until the fund has been reimbursed.
Even with these refinements, it seems possible that it will be considered that
the application of the fault criterion fails to result in sanctions that will have a
worthwhile effect on the care with which people drive, and that a decision will
be made to abandon the fault criterion either in whole or in part. But whether or
not the fault criterion is used, retention of private insurance in any form as the
major element in accident compensation would seem to require the following addi-
tional measures.
Third, while it has been said that every dog is allowed one bite, the financial
responsibility laws which allow every driver one accident carry too much risk of
throwing on society the costs associated with unrecovered losses of the victims or
the bankruptcy and disability of the driver at fault. Even if fault is eliminated,
there is no warrant for allowing automobile users to throw their losses onto the
community through bankruptcy or reliance on free or subsidized community services.
There seems to be no satisfactory alternative short of universal compulsory insurance,
whether under private or public auspices or some combination of the two.
Fourth, for somewhat comparable reasons, insurance must be without upper
bound on the amount of a judgment or loss for which the insurer will stand liable.
This system has caused no great difficulty in countries where it exists, and while
the contention is made that in the absence of specific limits juries would tend to make
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excessive awards, data available do not indicate that this is a serious danger; 9 the
more serious danger is that of leaving victims with grossly inadequate compensation
and defendants in bankruptcy. Moreover, in a fault system the existence of policy
limits introduces a serious conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured in
the settlement process, leading not only to inequitable results but to increased delays
and litigation.
Fifth, claimants should be entitled to recover, in addition to their damages, any
reasonable costs of prosecuting their claim up to the time when an offer of settlement
is made on terms determined to be adequate. This is important not only as a
matter of justice but as a means of reducing delays in settlement and the number
of cases brought to trial.
Sixth, while consideration may well be given to reducing the amount of compensa-
tion collectible by the victim in the light of other forms of compensation available,
such reduction should not operate to reduce the premiums payable by motorists:
rather, any reductions made on this account should be offset by payments either
into a state general fund or payments to the payors of the other forms of compensa-
tion as associated injured parties. The practical difficulties of discovering on a
reasonably uniform basis all of the various forms of such alternative compensation
may, however, be such as to make this on balance not worthwhile. In any case,
unless the general level of compensation, especially for the larger claims, can be
substantially increased, the number of cases of overcompensation arising from this
source is not likely to be a serious inequity.
Seventh, premiums should eventually be made to vary, by one means or another,
much more nearly in proportion to the actual mileage travelled. In the meantime,
data should be collected that will provide information as to how the cost of
accidents varies with the number of miles per year a vehicle is driven.
Finally, it should be noted that even if the concept of fault, in the sense of
improper behavior at the time of the accident, is eliminated entirely in the settle-
ment of accident compensation cases, this does not mean that one can automatically
abandon third-party liability or even that one can properly restrict such liability
to a small number of cases. If, as is sometimes suggested, the insurer of each car
should undertake to compensate, subject to the appropriate deductibles, for all
damage to that car and injury to its occupants regardless of fault, there still
remains the apportionment of liability for damage to wayside property and injuries
to pedestrians (eighteen per cent of all motor vehicle deaths are pedestrians). Also,
from another standpoint, types of vehicles differ widely in their propensity to inflict
damage on other vehicles and their occupants relative to their own susceptibility
to such damage. If an ancient Cadillac encounters a brand new Volkswagen, the
19 See Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 9 Oino Sr. L.J. 158,
171 (1958). While jurors may suppose that a defendant is insured, they are never told this fact, nor
are they informed of the limits of defendant's coverage. See note x3 supra.
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS: AN ECONOMIST'S CRITIQUE
damages sustained are not likely to be the same on both sides, either to the cars or
the occupants. If each car is insured to cover damages to itself and its occupants,
the premiums are unlikely to bear any very close proportionality to the expected
amount of accidental damage that the operation of that vehicle will cause. Even
more important is the relation between premiums charged trucks and those of
other vehicles: trucks are especially likely to inflict more damage on other vehicles
than they sustain themselves. Attractive as the notion is of having victims deal
only with their own insurers, it cannot be applied at all to injuries to pedestrians
and roadside property and cannot be applied as among motor vehicles without serious
misallocation of costs on the over-all activity level, including a substantial subsidy
to trucking from other motor vehicle usage.
SUMMARY
The pattern of reform that emerges from looking at the problem of motor-vehicle
accident compensation through the economist's spectacles differs considerably from
that produced from the lawyer's or politician's viewpoint. Reduction in cost is
desired, but only if it is a genuine reduction in the wasteful overheads, not if it is a
mere reduction in the size of the transfers to the injured on one pretext or another.
The payment of insurance premiums is seen as intimately related to other types of
highway user charges, even without the added possibility of substantially lowering
overhead costs through integration or coordination of these charges with one an-
other. Given the strongly entrenched vested interests of automobile users, the
automotive industry, the accident bar, the insurance industry, and their agents, it
is too much to hope that the above suggestions will be implemented on any wide
scale in the immediate future. But they do deserve careful examination, if only as
a contribution to a logical and rational approach to the problem.
